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Abstract 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant concept within accident analysis 
research. Viewing accidents as a result of uncontrolled system interactions, it forms 
the theoretical basis of various systemic accident analysis (SAA) models and 
methods. Despite the proposed benefits of SAA, such as an improved description of 
accident causation, evidence within the scientific literature suggests that these 
techniques are not being used in practice and that a research–practice gap exists. 
The aim of this study was to explore the issues stemming from research and practice 
which could hinder the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA. To achieve this, 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with 42 safety experts from ten countries 
and a variety of industries, including rail, aviation and maritime. This study suggests 
that the research–practice gap should be closed and efforts to bridge the gap should 
focus on ensuring that systemic methods meet the needs of practitioners and 
improving the communication of SAA research. 
1. Introduction 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant paradigm in accident analysis and 
human factors research (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 2012). It views 
socio-technical system accidents as the result of unexpected, uncontrolled 
relationships between a system’s constituent parts. This requires the study of 
systems as whole entities, rather than considering their parts in isolation. Many 
complex system accidents, e.g. space shuttle Columbia and Comair flight 5191, 
have not simply resulted from catastrophic equipment failure or an unsafe human 
action, as required according to traditional cause-effect accident models; instead 
accidents emerge as complex phenomena within the normal operational variability of 
a system (de Carvalho, 2011). Therefore, describing accidents in a sequential 
(cause-effect) fashion is arguably inadequate, as it is unable to sufficiently explain 
the non-linear complexity of modern-day socio-technical system accidents (Hollnagel, 
2004; Lindberg et al., 2010). It can also lead to equipment or humans at the ‘sharp 
end’ of a system being incorrectly blamed for an accident. This represents a missed 
opportunity to learn important lessons about system safety and, therefore, develop 
more effective safety recommendations. Use of the systems approach, via systemic 
accident analysis (SAA), supposedly avoids these limitations and it has been used 
as the conceptual foundation for various SAA methods and models, e.g. Systems 
Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes model (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004), the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004) and Accimap 
(Rasmussen, 1997). 
1.1. Systemic accident analysis in research 
A number of studies have compared SAA methods with established non-systemic 
analysis techniques, such as Fault Tree Analysis (e.g. Belmonte et al., 2011) and the 
Sequentially Timed Events Plotting method (e.g. Herrera and Woltjer, 2010). These 
studies and others like them (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011) suggest that, whilst the non-
systemic methods are suitable for describing what happened in an accident, the SAA 
techniques provide a deeper understanding of how dynamic, complex system 
behaviour contributed to the event. 
Furthermore, Leveson (2011, p. 349) comments that most accident reports are 
written from the perspective of cause-effect models and that the analysis frequently 
stops prematurely. Some studies exemplify this by stating that additional insights 
were achieved using SAA methods, when compared with the findings of official 
investigation reports (e.g. Jenkins et al., 2010; Johnson and de Almeida, 2008). The 
improved understanding of accident causation provided by SAA should, therefore, 
allow the development of more effective safety recommendations.  
1.2 Systemic accident analysis in practice  
Despite the proposed advantages of SAA, there is evidence within the scientific 
literature to suggest that methods and tools employing a systemic perspective are 
not being adopted in practice. For example, some researchers (e.g. Carhart and 
Yearworth, 2010; Leveson, 2011) comment that the most widely used accident 
analysis tools are based on sequential, reductionist models of systems and causality. 
Other researchers also suggest that SAA techniques are yet to gain acceptance 
outside of the research community (e.g. Okstad et al., 2012; Salmon et al., 2012a). 
These observations are supported by the sequential understanding of accident 
causation presented within various elements of the practitioner-focused safety 
literature (e.g. Energy Institute, 2008; Health and Safety Executive, 2004; Rail Safety 
Standards Board, 2011). 
1.3. The gap between research and practice 
The different analysis approaches taken by the researcher and practitioner 
communities suggest that a research–practice gap exists in the domain of SAA. 
Various aspects of the research–practice gap in accident analysis have been 
previously studied, both from a general perspective and within the context of SAA. 
Generic factors which can influence a practitioner’s approach to accident analysis 
have been identified, such as investigator bias and resource constraints (e.g. 
Johnson, 2003; Lundberg et al., 2010). These influences can arguably lead 
practitioners away from the theoretical ideal of accident investigation and therefore 
contribute to a research–practice gap (Lundberg et al., 2010). Other studies (e.g. 
Salmon et al., 2012a; Underwood and Waterson, 2012) have examined how the 
characteristics of several systemic analysis models impact on the ability of an 
individual to successfully perform SAA, such as the lack of method reliability caused 
by their qualitative nature. 
Despite the presence of such a research–practice gap there is evidence to suggest 
that a desire to adopt SAA exists within sections of the practitioner community. For 
example, accident investigators within aviation have begun to recognise the need to 
look beyond sequential analysis methods (e.g. Martinez, 2011, p. 8). Further-more, 
Steele and Pariès (2006) suggest that many practitioners acknowledge the 
limitations of traditional models and are keen to apply new techniques. Given that a 
demand to apply SAA seems to exist in both the researcher and practitioner 
communities, the research–practice gap needs to be examined in more depth. 
1.4. Study aims 
Whilst some of the research-based factors contributing to the SAA research–practice 
gap have been identified in previous studies (e.g. Underwood and Waterson, 2012), 
it is believed that practitioner-related influences, such as those described by 
Lundberg et al. (2010), require further examination within the context of SAA. 
Therefore, the following aims for the study were established: 
 Understand how the awareness of, and need for, SAA within the practitioner 
community could inhibit the adoption and use of SAA. 
 Understand how the factors influencing current analysis approaches may hinder 
the adoption and use of SAA. 
 Follow up and probe deeper into the issues stemming from research which may 
impede the diffusion of SAA into practice. 
2. Methods 
The use of semi-structured interviews was selected as the most appropriate method 
to achieve the aims of the study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the lack of 
information regarding SAA within the practitioner literature prevented the use of 
document analysis alone. Secondly, previous studies focused on the SAA research–
practice gap have used methods such as thematic analysis of the scientific literature 
(e.g. Underwood and Waterson, 2012) and user evaluations of SAA methods (e.g. 
Salmon et al., 2012a). Consequentially, interview data was viewed as the most 
suitable form of information to supplement the existing findings. Finally, semi-
structured interviews provide the ability to examine topics of interest in varying 
degrees of depth; an approach which suited the exploratory nature of this study 
(Robson, 2002). 
2.1. Sampling strategy 
Due to the study resource constraints, it was not possible to create a statistically 
representative sample. Therefore a convenience sample, considered to be indicative 
of the accident investigation community, was created. The sample included 
participants employed as full-time accident investigators, health and safety 
professionals (e.g. company safety managers), human factors specialists and 
accident analysis researchers. However, these participant categories were not 
mutually exclusive, e.g. some practitioners had research experience. Therefore, 
participants were allocated to the category associated with their current role as it was 
felt that their role would have the most influence on their analysis approach, e.g. due 
to resource constraints. Also, gaining a detailed understanding of how a participant’s 
background influenced their analysis approach was beyond the study scope. 
Human factors experts were recruited as they are often employed on a consultancy 
basis to provide input into accident investigations or safety-critical system design. 
The views of researchers were also sought to enable a comparison with the 
practitioners’ perspectives and further explore the research-based factors that may 
influence the SAA research–practice gap. 
Participants were required to have experience of investigating accidents and/or 
performing risk assessments within at least one safety-critical industry. No specific 
inclusion criteria were set regarding the level of their experience. Participant 
recruitment was halted when an appropriate level of thematic data saturation was 
judged to have been achieved. 
2.2. Participants 
Interviews were conducted with 42 participants (age range: 28–79 years; mean age: 
46.4 years) based in ten countries. The nine full time accident investigators (AI), 17 
health and safety professionals (HS), ten human factors specialists (HFE) and six 
researchers (R) had experience of working in at least one of 25 industries. Of these 
industries, those that had been worked in by at least five participants included: rail, 
aviation, maritime, oil and gas, defence, healthcare, nuclear power and 
manufacturing. The interviews lasted between 28 and 128 min (mean interview 
length: 70 min). 
2.3. Interview question design 
The interview questions were designed to understand the following topics: (1) the 
participants’ knowledge of SAA and accident causation, (2) the analysis methods 
and processes they currently use and (3) the barriers they feel prevent information 
flowing between the research and practice communities. In order to provide a 
comprehensive deductive analysis framework, the interview questions were based 
on these topics, the questions employed by Lundberg et al. (2010) and the findings 
of previous studies (e.g. Underwood and Waterson, 2012) (see Appendix A for 
interview questions). 
In addition to the interview questions, participants were asked to complete an 
analysis model awareness table (see Appendix B) which was specifically designed to 
assess their level of awareness and usage of well-known systemic and non-systemic 
techniques. The STAMP, FRAM and Accimap methods were included as they have 
been identified as the most frequently cited systemic analysis tools (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2012). The Swiss Cheese model (Reason, 1997) and Fault Tree Analysis 
(Watson, 1961) were also included as they are examples of traditional techniques 
commonly mentioned in the scientific literature (e.g. Katsakiori et al., 2009; Qureshi, 
2007; Sklet, 2004). 
2.4. Data collection and analysis 
Five pilot interviews were conducted and analysed. The inter-view schedule was 
reviewed and amended, where necessary, after each interview. The main interview 
study was subsequently performed with a minor iteration of the interview schedule 
generated halfway through the process (wording of two questions was changed). 
Upon the conclusion of the data collection phase a theoretic (i.e. deductive) and 
inductive thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke (2006), was 
performed on the interview transcriptions using NVivo 9. 
2.5. Research–practice gap evaluation framework 
Research–practice gaps signify the impairment of transferring new information 
between the research and practice communities. The transference process itself, 
sometimes termed the ‘diffusion of innovation’, has been the focus of a number of 
studies which have produced a range of theories and models (e.g. Greenhalgh et al., 
2004; Rogers, 2003). Rohrbach et al. (1993) summarised the stages involved in 
achieving long-term commitment to new ideas which arguably relate to transferring 
SAA from research into practice. Firstly, the awareness of an innovation, e.g. SAA, is 
created within the practitioner community. The second and third steps involve 
practitioners committing to adopt and subsequently implementing the new systemic 
techniques. These steps were used as a frame-work to evaluate whether issues 
discovered in the data could affect a given stage and therefore contribute to the 
formation of a gap. 
3. Findings 
3.1. Key themes 
The themes which were considered to be key issues, i.e. topics that were mentioned 
by at least 20% of the participants, are presented in Table 1. 
Theme (relevant article section) 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
Human 
factors 
expert 
Researcher Total 
1. Requirement for accountability 
influences analysis approach 
(3.3.3) 
56 41 30 67 45 
2. Model not practitioner focused 
(3.3.1) 33 24 80 50 43 
3. Empirical validation 
requirements (3.3.4) 11 35 60 50 38 
4. Analyst chooses a technique 
that suits the situation (3.4.1 and 
3.6.1) 
56 35 30 17 36 
5. Previous experience and training 
affects analysis (3.4.2) 67 18 30 50 36 
6. Model suits user's way of 
thinking (3.3.2) 22 24 30 67 31 
7. Research considered too 
conceptual (3.2.5) 56 12 30 17 26 
8. Analysis time requirements 
(3.4.1) 44 6 40 33 26 
9. Company policy affects analysis 
(3.5.1) 22 18 50 17 26 
10. Amount of training given (3.2.3) 33 24 30 0 24 
11. User's previous training and 
experience affects model 
preference (3.3.2) 
11 24 20 50 24 
12. Lack of communication 
between researcher and 
practitioner communities (3.2.5) 
56 18 10 0 21 
Table 1 – Key themes 
Whilst the number of participant comments indicates the importance of a given 
theme, the non-representative nature of the sample means that this cannot be 
meaningfully tested (see Section 5 for more information). Therefore, the key themes 
listed in Table 1 are described alongside others that were deemed to influence SAA 
awareness, adoption and usage and contribute to the research–practice gap. 
3.2. SAA awareness 
3.2.1. Current level of SAA awareness 
The scientific literature presented in Section 1 describes a general lack of systemic 
analysis model usage with industry. This situation does not necessarily stem from 
low levels of SAA aware-ness and comments from several senior practitioners 
indicate that awareness is growing within industry: 
“Lots and lots of people talk about this [systemic analysis approach] and it’s very 
current in a lot of the safety and high-hazard industry community.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
Furthermore, notable remarks from two participants provide evidence that systemic 
models are currently employed in certain industry sectors. One individual 
commented that both Accimap and FRAM are used within their national transport 
accident investigation agency. A second participant with a background in human 
factors described the Accimap training provided by their organisation to accident 
investigators within the rail industry. 
However, the analysis model awareness table responses obtained from the 
participants suggest that the majority of practitioners remain unaware of the most 
frequently cited systemic analysis models, i.e. STAMP, FRAM and Accimap (see Fig. 
1) (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). 
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This is in contrast to the responses of the researchers who were interviewed and 
indicates that knowledge and use of these models is greater within the scientific 
community. The research-based participants only accounted for 14% of the sample 
and therefore this comparison must be made tentatively. However, it is indicative of 
the lack of SAA model usage within industry portrayed in the scientific literature and 
provides further evidence that a research–practice gap exists. 
In addition, a different understanding of SAA seems to exist between the two 
communities. When asked to provide a description of the ‘systems approach to 
accident analysis’, the two most common characteristics mentioned by participants 
referred to ‘component interactions’ and ‘analysing the whole system’, which are key 
elements of SAA. However, relatively fewer practitioners (AI = 22%, HS = 27%, HFE 
= 30%) referred to ‘component interactions’ compared with the researchers (67%). 
The ‘analysing the whole system’ feature was also referred to by relatively fewer 
practitioners (AI = 22%, HS = 20%, HFE = 40%) compared with the researchers 
(50%). Five practitioners described SAA as a ‘systematic’ approach, rather than 
providing examples of ‘systemic’ analysis characteristics, which suggests a degree 
of confusion may exist regarding SAA terminology. Furthermore, five practitioners 
were unable to provide a definition. 
3.2.2. The demand for SAA information 
Whilst there is a clear theoretical argument for the use of SAA (see Section 1), 
various factors exist which may negate the need or opportunity for a practitioner to 
seek out a systemic analysis tool. Some practitioners simply have no desire to 
change their current approach and therefore have no need for new information: 
“I can’t say that I’ve actively gone and looked at the new techniques that are out 
there as the ones I’ve always used have worked.” (Health and safety professional) 
Additionally, day-to-day workload demands were considered by some individuals to 
restrict their learning opportunities: 
“I don’t have nearly enough time to keep up with the [research] paperwork in this 
area; hardly any at all. That’s a problem that most practitioners have; they’re so busy 
doing investigations it’s very difficult to keep up with the theoretical side.” (Accident 
investigator) 
These comments highlight factors which inhibit the search for SAA-related 
information. However, should a practitioner decide to use a systemic analysis 
technique, they are still faced with obstacles associated with accessing and utilising 
the relevant research. 
3.2.3. Extent of training impacts awareness 
An individual’s awareness of analysis methods is dictated, at least in part, by the 
level of training they receive. The extent of training received has clear implications 
with regards to the opportunity to increase awareness of SAA and comments from 
participants indicate that levels of training are role-dependent. Full-time investigators, 
for example, sometimes receive extensive training via university-level courses: 
“After you join, the first two years is spent doing a diploma, through a university here, 
in accident investigation.” (Accident investigator) 
However, it may also be the case that other practitioners with varying degrees of 
involvement with accident investigation receive less training: 
“We had analytical investigation methods training which was a week-long course. 
The course started as a week but latterly I think it went down to one and a half days.” 
(Human factors expert) 
Several participants with experience in the rail and nuclear sectors remarked that 
individuals with lower levels of responsibility for accident investigation may not have 
received any relevant training. 
3.2.4. Accessibility of SAA information 
Individuals who are not provided with SAA training can find gaining access to the 
relevant information problematic, which may limit their awareness. The time and 
costs associated with the acquiring the necessary training, for example, may be 
excessive: 
“A lot of time, when you hear about courses, it costs a lot of money to go which 
dissuaded me from going.” (Health and safety professional) 
Furthermore, an accident investigator, a health and safety professional and a human 
factors expert all remarked that the cost of purchasing scientific journal articles and 
attending conferences may prohibit access to SAA information. 
As well as cost, intellectual property rights can form another barrier to acquiring 
scientific research information: 
“The academic community is very competitive. There’s intellectual property rights 
problems in industry too but normally if there’s a buck in it, or a common benefit, 
you’ll collaborate and create an alliance. I find it very hard to get an alliance of 
academics.” (Health and safety professional) 
3.2.5. Communication of SAA information 
Each participant was asked to list the sources of information they utilise in order to 
keep their knowledge up-to-date. 40 participants provided answers, which are 
summarised in Table 2. 
Source of information 
Percentage of participants 
Accident 
investigator 
(n = 9) 
Health and 
safety 
professional 
(n = 16) 
Human 
factors 
expert 
(n=10) 
Practitioner 
total 
Researcher 
(n = 5) 
Colleagues and 
network contacts 56 44 60 51 60 
Conferences 33 50 40 43 20 
Internet searches 22 13 10 14 0 
Investigation reports 11 19 0 11 0 
Online forums and 
networks 11 19 0 11 0 
Practitioner literature 
and professional 
institutes 
33 44 70 49 20 
Research literature 22 6 50 23 100 
Research projects 0 19 10 11 60 
Textbooks 22 6 10 11 0 
Training and 
experience 44 31 20 31 20 
Does not search for 
information 0 6 0 3 0 
Table 2 - Sources of information 
Table 2 indicates that the three most popular sources of new information for 
practitioners, in general, are speaking with colleagues and members of their 
extended networks, attending conferences and consulting industry literature and 
professional institutes. In comparison, Table 2 suggests that the majority of 
researchers tend to gain new knowledge via the scientific literature and by 
conducting research projects, as well as consulting colleagues. The data in Table 2 
also suggests that most practitioners do not consult the scientific literature. 
Moreover, some of the practitioners specifically remarked on a general lack of 
communication between the research and practice communities: 
“I’m not aware of any real liaison between the two [communities].” (Human factors 
expert) 
“We hardly ever meet people on the theoretical side; it’s once in a blue moon.” 
(Accident investigator) 
When practitioners do engage with the research community the information 
presented is considered by some practitioners to be too conceptual and provides 
little or no practical benefit: 
“I know some accident investigators that have been to international conferences 
where there were lots of academics putting forward papers on approaches to 
accident investigation. The practitioners in the audience said ‘this is actually 
meaningless and we don’t use it.”’ (Accident investigator) 
Consequently practitioners can develop a sense of disregard for researchers which 
could further influence the apparent lack of SAA communication: 
“There is a mentality within practitioners where academics are seen as people sitting 
in an ivory tower and haven’t had any real expe-rience of accident investigation so 
[practitioners think] ‘how can they comment on investigations?’” (Accident 
investigator) 
3.3. SAA adoption 
3.3.1. Practicality of analysis method 
Even if sufficient awareness of research is obtained, barriers to its adoption may 
arise from a lack of consideration for practitioner requirements. The features of an 
analysis method desired most by participants referred to aspects of usability, such as 
the simplicity of using a method (see Fig. 2). 
  
 
 
Figure 2 – Preferred features of an analysis method 
The importance of designing a usable technique was reflected in the comments of 
several individuals: 
“I think if you make it simple, people will use it. If it’s complicated, they won’t and it 
becomes another job that’s too difficult to do and it gets put on the shelf.” (Health 
and safety professional) 
Other practicality-related issues which may inhibit the adoption of research were also 
referred to by participants. Several accident investigators, for example, commented 
on a possible lack of appreciation for the practicalities of their role in the design of 
analysis methods. The potentially excessive cost of implementing research was also 
highlighted by a human factors expert. 
3.3.2. Personal adoption criteria 
In addition to the practicalities of using an analysis technique, adoption may also be 
influenced by a number of factors based on an individual’s personal preference and 
experience. A person’s decision to adopt a method may be, for example, based on 
how well it suits their way of thinking: 
“When I think of the Swiss Cheese model, I can really think of those barriers being 
broken and trying to find out why they have been broken. For me it’s a very natural 
way of investigating. Some people really hate it but for me it works.” (Accident 
investigator) 
The preference for a given model can also be influenced by an individual’s previous 
experience and training: 
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“If I had trained with other people I would probably have a very different default 
model that I use. I think it’s mostly my [educational] upbringing that makes it very 
difficult to think of anything else.” (Researcher) 
Experience gained by analysis method usage was specifically highlighted by several 
participants who remarked that their decision to adopt a technique was based upon 
the outcome of an initial trial period. 
3.3.3. Accountability influences analysis approach 
The analysis approach taken by a practitioner can be influenced by their need to 
assign liability for an accident. Some individuals remarked that they prefer or are 
mandated to avoid seeking blame in favour of focusing on safety improvements, as 
per the systems approach. However, other practitioners who are more concerned 
with the commercial and legal implications of accidents may seek to apportion blame: 
“The way the analysis was set up was really to assist with legal proceedings. That 
was the main driver. . . [it was] not always to find out what the root cause was. It 
would be more to do with whether a prosecution was likely to be successful or not.” 
(Human factors expert) 
This is particularly evident when those who are conducting an investigation may be 
deemed culpable and are incentivised to apportion liability elsewhere:  
“Because it’s the manager that carries out the industry’s own investigation they’re not 
really going to look at themselves and they’re certainly not going to look at their own 
management chain because that puts them in a threatening position.” (Accident 
investigator) 
In addition to the influence on SAA adoption, the need to demonstrate liability can 
also influence the use of an analysis technique. One health and safety professional, 
for example, referred to the occasions where he was instructed by clients to use their 
analysis tools in particular ways in order to avoid ‘black spots’ on their safety records. 
3.3.4. Model validation 
The extent of an analysis model’s empirical validation was considered by many 
practitioners to be a key influence on their adoption decision. Several participants 
commented on the need for extensive validation to demonstrate that a method has 
been ‘proven’ and can be ‘trusted’: 
“Has it been tried and tested? Does it add value? We have to ask these questions 
when we implement something.” (Health and safety professional) 
A number of individuals who provide consultancy services in accident investigation 
and risk analysis specifically commented on the importance of a method’s track 
record when attempting to establish the credibility of their work with clients. However, 
less consideration was given to the extent of a method’s conceptual validity: 
“Validity comes very much down the line. I think it’s very much about quickness and 
whether the technique is understood in the community, if I’m brutally honest.” (Health 
and safety professional) 
3.4. SAA usage 
3.4.1. Usage resource constraints 
The level of effort invested in an analysis will be based, at least in part, by the 
resources available to the investigation team: 
“There’s a 14 out of 15 chance that we’re not going to go to an investigation that we 
should do and that’s simply because of funding.” (Accident investigator) 
Consequently this can affect whether an individual employs more complex analysis 
techniques, such as those based on the systems approach: 
“[Name of method] is something that I’ve been trained in but I’d only use it if there 
had been a major incident, whereas the 5 Whys method (Ohno, 1988) is probably a 
starting point for a nice and simple easy one. I think the more complex the incident 
you’d pull in more of the techniques to give you the answer.”  (Health and safety 
professional) 
In addition to whether an analysis method is used, the time and financial constraints 
involved in accident investigation can also affect how it is used. Several participants, 
for example, remarked that the depth of analysis they can achieve with their 
preferred technique is limited by the time available to them. 
3.4.2. Model reliability 
If a systemic analysis technique is adopted by a practitioner there are factors related 
to reliability which will affect its usage. A number of participants remarked on the 
influence that an individual’s background and experience has on their analysis 
approach and how this can produce variation in investigation findings. Open 
discussions and analysis reviews which result in a consensus on the investigation 
findings can help minimise the biasing effects of individuals’ backgrounds; a process 
which is common with full-time investigators: 
“The inspector will do a very structured presentation to a group of inspectors where 
we challenge what he’s done, what he’s said and what evidence he’s got that’s 
sufficient to make the conclusions that he’s drawing together.” (Accident investigator) 
However, several participants commented on how the qualitative nature of the 
systemic analysis tools could increase the difficulty of reaching such an agreement: 
“If you turned up with an Accimap and said ‘the system is safe because I’ve analysed 
it in an Accimap’ you’d just get laughed out of the room. They’d pick it to pieces 
because it’s far more subjective.” (Human factors expert) 
3.4.3. Data requirements of SAA 
Several factors relating to the data requirements of SAA were considered by 
participants to impact on their ability to use the systemic analysis methods. For 
example, the system-wide data needed to perform SAA is not always available: 
“If I were to go and work in industry now I think I would have to revert back to more 
simple accident analysis methods just because the data wouldn’t be there to support 
them [the SAA methods].” (Researcher) 
Some practitioners mentioned that the accident information databases they are 
required to use employ coding taxonomies which reflect the theoretical (cause-effect) 
underpinnings of sequential techniques. This may influence the type of data that is 
collected and one individual observed that, even if they gather data relevant to SAA, 
they must transpose their findings into a non-systemic format.  
These issues appear to stem, in part, from the fact that researchers and practitioners 
have fundamentally different approaches to analysis and therefore different data 
requirements: 
“Sometimes I do feel there is an important division between how practitioners and 
some academics treat accident investigation. We’re always looking at specifics and 
therefore evidence will some-times take us down a very specific path and we don’t 
need to consider the wider aspects and vulnerabilities of the system.” (Accident 
investigator) 
3.5. Organisational influences on the research–practice gap 
3.5.1. Organisational policy 
Some individuals have the freedom to choose which analysis technique they adopt 
and use. However, in many cases, organisational policy dictates which methods are 
used: 
“We tend to find that when people come here [for investigation training] they want to 
know all about the models and how to use all of them but often they go back to an 
organisation that says ‘this is what we use’ so they don’t really get the opportunity.” 
(Researcher) 
Practitioners who provide investigation services on a consultancy basis also 
commented that requests from some clients to use in-house analysis techniques can 
produce similar barriers to analysis tool usage. Organisational policy can also impact 
on the resources available for practitioners to learn and use new analysis methods 
and therefore create the issues described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.4.1. 
A link between safety culture and organisational policy was referred to by several 
individuals who observed that their analysis approaches were, in part, dictated by the 
senior management and the safety culture they instilled. A number of participants 
also commented that safety-related changes they recommended to senior 
management teams, such as introducing new accident investigation policies, 
sometimes needed to be presented in cost-benefit, rather than safety improvement, 
terms: 
“When I turned up at [company name] there was no health and safety. They didn’t 
care about which safety regulation said they had to do risk assessments. What I had 
to do was sell them the cost-effectiveness [of safety]. When I put it into a dollar sign 
they understood it and then their attitude became ‘this is good for the company and it 
prevents reputational damage as well.’” (Health and safety professional) 
  
3.6. Industry influences on the research–practice gap 
3.6.1. Regulatory requirements 
The degree of regulation within a given industry can have a large influence on what 
type of analysis techniques are used in accident investigation and risk assessments: 
“Regulators [in the nuclear industry] dictate exactly what methods need to be used 
and they’re very slow to update their opinions on these things.” (Human factors 
expert) 
“There is a degree of flexibility. No one is telling me that I have to use the Swiss 
Cheese model and that is it. This is an International Maritime Organisation resolution, 
don’t forget, and is not mandatory.” (Accident investigator) 
The comments of many practitioners indicated that SAA-based regulation is not in 
place across industry in general. This may be due to a lack of SAA awareness at the 
regulatory level, rather than a decision to reject it: 
“The regulation probably doesn’t recognise [the systems approach] or encourage it 
at the minute. I don’t know about the military or anyone like that but certainly in the 
railway industry it doesn’t seem to.” (Health and safety professional) 
3.6.2. Industry characteristics 
In addition to the regulatory environment of an industry, the suitability of performing 
SAA within a given industry may depend on a range of domain characteristics, e.g. 
degree of operational complexity: 
“If you look at highly dynamic, very complex systems then the systems approach is 
more appropriate. If you’re looking at things like the manufacturing industry, it’s 
probably less appropriate, and things like the Bowtie method or something a bit more 
linear is probably more suitable.” (Human factors expert) 
“If you are in a highly defined, highly automated environment requiring software 
reliability, for instance in medical systems, then it makes absolute sense to use the 
STAMP technique. It’s an issue of horses for courses.” (Health and safety 
professional) 
  
3.6.3. Resistance to change 
The effort and cost of implementing an innovation, such as SAA, within an 
organisation or throughout an industry by means of new regulations can create 
resistance to change. This inertia can increase with the level of regulation: 
“Once you get a nuclear power plant licensed you don’t ever want to change it 
because you’ve spent so much money. So, by its very nature, a very heavily 
regulated industry cannot be innovative.” (Health and safety professional) 
“I would say changing anything in healthcare at a national level is really, really 
difficult. It takes a long time and there’s a lot of consultation involved. If we were 
going to change the way we work, there’s huge numbers of people who have a stake 
in what we do.” (Human factors expert) 
4. Discussion 
The topics presented in Section 3 describe a wide range of issues that can affect if, 
and how, research is applied by practitioners. When considering all of these factors 
together they can be viewed as providing a wider context in which the research 
practice-gap is played out. Whilst not an exhaustive list, it is believed that the range 
of themes included in Section 3 is comprehensive enough to provide an adequate 
representation of the gap. The findings are graphically summarised in Fig. 3, which is 
based on the evaluation framework derived from the work of Rohrbach et al. (1993) 
(see Section 2.5). 
 Figure 3 – The SAA research-practice gap 
Discussion on the features of the gap and the implications for SAA is provided in the 
remainder of Section 4. 
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4.1. Issues associated with the research–practice gap 
The majority of issues raised by participants may contribute, at least in part, to a 
general gap between accident analysis research and practice. Therefore, these 
factors could hinder the success of any new analysis method, regardless of its 
theoretical under-pinning. What then are the characteristic features of the SAA 
research–practice gap? This question is explored further within the context of SAA 
awareness, adoption and usage in the rest of Section 4.1. 
4.1.1. SAA awareness 
The opportunity to learn about new analysis techniques, e.g. via training (see 
Section 3.2.3), access to and the communication of the relevant information (see 
Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5) will affect a practitioner’s awareness of any technique. 
However, it is worth commenting on how these issues relate to SAA. It is 
acknowledged within the literature that SAA requires extensive theoretical and 
domain knowledge, training and for-mal education (e.g. Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; 
Johansson and Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et al., 2012a; Sklet, 2004). 
It is therefore conceivable that practitioners will only be made aware of systemic 
analysis tools in the more in-depth training courses. In addition, it is the belief of the 
authors that the majority of SAA information is presented via the scientific literature 
and at conferences. SAA has been presented at conferences (e.g. Kazaras and 
Kirytopoulos, 2011; Underwood and Waterson, 2012), however, as conferences 
appear to be the third most popular source of information for practitioners (see Table 
2), it is arguable that SAA is not being promoted in the most effective way. 
The cost of training, scientific literature and conference proceedings can limit SAA 
awareness. However, information regarding SAA is freely available on the internet 
from sources such as Google Scholar, Nancy Leveson’s MIT website 
(http://sunnyday.mit.edu/) and Erik Hollnagel’s FRAM related website 
(http://www.functionalresonance.com/). This suggests that it is the issues 
surrounding SAA communication (see Section 3.2.5) that may be a more significant 
influence on awareness. Given that practitioners can lose interest in research that is 
too conceptual it is possible that the considerable amount of accident causation 
theory present in the systems approach literature may dissuade them from learning 
more about SAA. 
4.1.2. SAA adoption  
As with the awareness of SAA, there are several factors related to the adoption of an 
analysis technique which are influenced by features of the systems approach. 
The importance of an analysis method’s usability was reflected in the comments of 
practitioners (see Section 3.3.1). Whilst there is varying opinion within the literature 
with regard to the usability of the systemic analysis techniques their use has been 
viewed in some cases as time-consuming (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; Johansson and 
Lindgren, 2008; Salmon et al., 2011). This issue can become increasingly 
problematic for individuals whose main responsibilities do not include the 
investigation of accidents, as they may have less time to conduct analyses. SAA 
may not be suited to and, therefore, adopted by them. 
The notion that more effective safety recommendations can be devised by the 
avoidance of blaming a suitable culprit is well established in the SAA literature (e.g. 
Leveson, 2004) and was echoed in the comments of several participants (see 
Section 3.3.3). How-ever, searching for human error makes it easier to find out who 
is responsible for an accident and various practitioners emphasised that 
demonstrating accountability, particularly from a legal or commercial perspective, is 
still an objective of accident investigation (Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2011). 
Therefore, practitioners may be incentivised to use non-systemic analysis techniques 
to ease the identification of culpable personnel (Underwood and Waterson, 2012). 
Most practitioners in safety-oriented businesses tend to prefer well established 
methods; a point which was raised by the participants (Johansson and Lindgren, 
2008). Although STAMP, FRAM and Accimap have been applied across a variety of 
safety-critical domains this has mainly taken place within an academic context, e.g. 
accident analysis case studies (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a). The comments of 
participants, therefore, suggest that SAA methods will require considerable empirical 
validation within an industrial set-ting if they are to gain acceptance from 
practitioners (see Section 3.3.4). 
4.1.3. SAA usage 
If a practitioner takes the decision to adopt a systemic analysis method they are 
faced with several issues which can hinder the application of SAA. 
SAA is not a simple endeavour and requires significant analyst effort and access to 
various subject matter experts (Salmon et al., 2012b). SAA may, therefore, only be 
suited to major accident investigations where funding, time and personnel are 
sufficient to obtain the amount of information required for SAA. Indeed, both Leveson 
(2004) and Salmon et al. (2012b) suggest that the data requirements of STAMP and 
Accimap are only typically met via the comprehensive reports produced after a large 
scale accident. 
Furthermore, individuals may not be able to gain access to the data required for SAA. 
For example, such information may exist outside of the organisation ‘affected’ by the 
accident (e.g. commercially sensitive documentation from an equipment supplier) or 
an individual may be in the ‘wrong’ position within an organisation to address the 
whole scope of an accident (e.g. unable to interview senior managers) (Dien et al., 
2012). In addition to the varying levels of information access, the type of data that is 
collected can also influence the application of SAA. Accident data is reported, 
collected and compiled in databases over time in line with national regulations and 
established codification systems (Mullai, 2004; Mullai and Paulsson, 2011). However, 
in some cases these databases and coding schemes are not based around the 
systems approach (e.g. they just focus on local events at the ‘sharp end’ of a system) 
and the information required to populate them is, there-fore, unlikely to enable 
thorough SAA (Roelen et al., 2011; Salmon et al., 2012b). 
4.1.4. Organisational and industry issues 
A significant influence on a practitioner’s selection of a model is the safety culture of 
their organisation. The comments of a number of participants (see Section 3.5.1) 
reflect the findings of Lundberg et al. (2012), who suggest that four aspects of safety 
culture can influence the decision to implement safety-related changes: 
institutionalised low safety standards, prioritisation of safety, the decision making 
criteria to adopt changes and the level of resources allocated to implement them. 
These factors clearly apply to the implementation of any new analysis method. 
However it is arguable that, in some cases, obtaining organisational (or regulatory) 
commitment to making a fundamental shift to employ SAA may be harder than 
implementing a modification of an existing sequential technique. 
The comments from practitioners (see Section 3.6.2) indicate that, depending on the 
industry in question, the use of SAA may not always be appropriate. This notion is 
supported by Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) who suggest that systemic models are 
best suited to accidents within highly complex, intractable systems, e.g. nuclear 
power plants. Therefore, whilst the generic nature of the systemic models means 
that they can be applied in any domain, the notion that ‘one size does not fit all’ 
means that the resulting ‘competition’ from other analysis techniques represents a 
further barrier to SAA adoption (Mullai and Paulsson, 2011; Salmon et al., 2012a). 
However, although new models often criticise or even disqualify older ones, in reality 
these different techniques can complement each other due to their own strengths 
and weaknesses (Jacobsson et al., 2009). This issue has been examined in studies 
which combined systemic and non-systemic techniques (e.g. Ferjencik, 2011; 
Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012) and suggest that a more insightful analysis is 
achieved compared to that when using a single model. This indicates that aspects of 
SAA may be successfully utilised in many industries, regardless of their complexity. 
4.2. Does the SAA research–practice gap need to be closed? 
So far, this article has described and discussed a number of features that may 
prevent the use of SAA techniques by practitioners. An important question that 
naturally follows this discourse is ‘does the SAA research–practice gap need to be 
closed?’ 
The proposed benefits of SAA presented in Section 1, i.e. gaining an improved 
understanding of accidents which may lead to more effective recommendations, 
suggest that it should be. Research that has compared SAA methods with non-
systemic analysis techniques indicates that these benefits can be achieved and, 
therefore, that SAA should be promoted throughout safety critical domains (see 
Section 1.1). Whilst sequential techniques may remain effective in certain 
circumstances, e.g. the analysis of less complex systems or of sub-
systems/components, the ever-rising complexity of socio-technical systems suggests 
that the use of SAA will become increasingly important in the future (Hollnagel and 
Speziali, 2008; Salmon et al., 2011). 
However, the difference between SAA and the current practices of some accident 
investigators seems to be a subtle one. The Swiss Cheese model (SCM), which has 
been widely adopted in various industries (e.g. healthcare and aviation) is described 
as a sequential technique by some researchers (e.g. Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 
2011). However, it does provide a holistic multi-level analysis approach, as per SAA, 
and later versions of the model (see Reason, 1997) also take account of the fact that 
‘active failures’ are not required for an accident to occur. Additionally, a number of 
organisations have purposely neutralised the language used in their SCM-based 
models to avoid attributing blame, such as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
and EUROCONTROL. Even within the research community, confusion exists over 
whether the SCM is a systemic technique, as exemplified by researchers who cite it 
(and methods based on it) as such (e.g. Salmon et al., 2012a; Stanton et al., 2012). 
Therefore, acknowledging the existence of a SAA research–practice gap seems to 
depend on which view of accident causation is taken by an individual. 
Despite this ambiguity, what seems clear is that SAA methods are theoretically 
capable of providing useful insights into complex socio-technical system accidents 
which are not generated by many traditional analysis techniques. Therefore, efforts 
to increase practitioner awareness, adoption and usage of SAA should be made. 
4.3. Bridging the SAA research–practice gap 
Whilst one of the factors presented in Section 3 may be sufficient to prevent a 
practitioner from conducting SAA, it is more likely that they all, to a greater or lesser 
extent, combine to inhibit the application of the systems approach. So, if the SAA 
research–practice gap is to be closed, which of issues presented in Section 3 should 
be tackled? An initial step in answering this question can be made by considering the 
key themes contained in Table 1. The majority of these themes focus on two aspects: 
ensuring that the SAA methods meet the needs of the practitioners (themes 2–4, 8); 
communicating SAA research in a more effective manner (themes 5, 7, 9–12). 
In order to meet the analysis needs of practitioners, it must be established if, and 
how, the systemic methods need to be adapted to meet the demands of live 
investigations and accident trend analysis. This process has begun and discussions 
between the two communities are taking place, e.g. the annual STAMP and FRAM 
workshops organised respectively by Nancy Leveson and Erik Hollnagel. However, 
to the authors’ knowledge, practitioner feedback has yet to be widely publicised. 
Therefore, further efforts should be made to establish whether the SAA methods can 
be effectively applied in industry. Ideally, this work would involve recruiting accident 
investigators to use, evaluate and help refine the systemic techniques; a process 
that was also involved in successfully establishing other analysis methods, such as 
HFACS (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000) and Tripod Delta (Hudson et al., 1994). As 
indicated by the data presented in Fig. 2, the evaluations should initially focus on the 
methods’ usability, validity and the usefulness of their outputs. This process would 
bring the added advantage of providing a degree of empirical validation and help 
create the ‘track record’ desired by various elements of the practitioner community. 
Given that there may be reluctance to trial a new technique in live investigations, the 
use of high-fidelity simulated investigations would provide a suitable alternative. 
Research should also be conducted into developing industry-specific taxonomies for 
classifying contributing systemic factors to improve the reliability of the SAA methods 
and their suitability for multiple accident case analysis (Salmon et al., 2012a).  
Achieving more effective communication of SAA research to practitioners can be 
accomplished via a number of routes. Table 2 suggests that, along with continued 
presentation of research at conferences, promoting SAA within the practitioner 
literature and professional institutes would increase the awareness of many 
practitioners. Steele and Pariès (2006) comment that successful communication of 
‘less traditional’ perspectives on accident causality to practitioners target the 
layperson, convincingly summarise such ideas and make them seem like common 
sense. Information created for the practitioner-focused literature should be produced 
to meet these criteria. This may be particularly relevant for practitioners who only 
have a part-time involvement in accident investigation. Increasing the amount of SAA 
information provided in accident analysis training offers another important option for 
increasing awareness and adoption of systemic methods. Ideally this training would 
be conducted strategically to maximise its impact. As a starting point, the training 
should be provided to accident investigation trainers. This would utilise an existing 
net-work of professional trainers that can act as effective and efficient interface 
between the researcher and practitioner communities. Ideally, industry regulators 
and senior safety managers should also be trained in SAA. If the regulators and 
organisations formally adopt SAA then the need/requirement for individuals to 
employ systemic techniques in accident analysis will increase. However, until a SAA 
track record can be established in industry, it is unlikely that regulators and 
organisations will commit to formally adopt and use the systemic analysis techniques. 
Therefore, achieving this commitment is likely to be a long-term aim of bridging the 
research–practice gap. 
4.4. Can the SAA research–practice gap be closed? 
Whilst the proposed solutions described in Section 4.3 offer a means of bridging the 
research–practice gap, it may not be possible to completely close it. A number of 
researchers (e.g. Dekker, 2011; Stanton et al., 2012; Zio and Ferrario, 2013) are 
continuing to explore the nature of systemic accidents by considering the behaviour 
of ever-larger ‘systems of systems’. For example, the drift into failure concept 
proposed by Dekker (2011) promotes looking ‘up and out’ at various factors which 
operate at a global level, such as sociological and political conditions, and how they 
affect system safety. Investigating and rectifying such issues is likely to remain 
beyond the scope of accident investigation, at least in the short term, due to a variety 
of issues such as resource constraints. There-fore, whilst is it is the role of the 
research community to further the understanding of systemic accidents, some of this 
knowledge may not be practicable to apply. However, efforts should still be made to 
bridge the research–practice gap so that SAA knowledge can be utilised when 
possible. 
5. Study limitations 
Given that this study utilised a non-representative convenience sample, as indicated 
in Section 3.1, a number of limitations were placed on the findings. For example, 
statistically testing the relative importance of themes identified by the participants or 
the differences observed across roles, industries and countries would not produce 
results that could be generalised. This means that the representation of the 
research–practice gap in Fig. 3 can only present the contributing factors, rather than 
their relative influence. However, the use of a convenience sample resulted from the 
resource constraints of the study rather than a lack of consideration of sample 
design. Given the number of people who are involved in accident analysis, achieving 
a representative sample from which results could be generalised would be a 
significant challenge. Despite the limitations imposed by the nature of the sample, 
the authors believe that the findings of this study offer some useful insights and 
direction for future work. 
6. Conclusions 
The systems approach is arguably the dominant concept within accident analysis 
research. Its application, via systemic accident analysis (SAA), supposedly provides 
an improved description of accident causation, avoids the incorrect apportioning of 
blame for an accident and helps inform more effective safety recommendations. 
However, despite the suggested benefits of SAA, evidence within the scientific 
literature indicates that systemic analysis models and methods are not being widely 
used in practice. This implies that a research–practice gap exists which impacts on 
the awareness, adoption and usage of SAA. 
This study examined various issues stemming from both the research and practice 
communities which may hinder the application of SAA. Some of these factors are 
indicative of a general research–practice gap in accident analysis. However, others 
are more pertinent to SAA, such as its lack of track record within industry and the 
possible incentive to use non-systemic techniques to facilitate the attribution of 
liability. The benefits of SAA suggest that the research–practice gap should be 
closed. Efforts to bridge the gap should focus on ensuring that SAA methods meet 
the needs of practitioners and improving the communication of SAA research. 
Appendix A 
Interview questions 
Background information 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your current job title? 
3. What are the main duties of your current role? 
4. As a percentage, how much of your time is spent analysing accidents? 
5. How many years of experience do you have of analysing accidents? 
6. How many accidents have you analysed? 
7. What types of accidents have you analysed? 
8. Which industries did these accidents occur in? 
9. When would you be called into perform an analysis/risk assessment? 
10. In your opinion, what is the main reason why major accidents within the industry 
you work in? 
10.1 Why? 
  
The systems approach 
11. Have you heard of the systems approach? 
12. What is your understanding of the systems approach to accident analysis? 
12.1 How did you gain this understanding? 
13. Do you apply a systems approach to accident analysis? 
13.1 How do you apply it? 
14. What do you think the benefits of using the systems approach are? 
15. What are the drawbacks of using the systems approach? 
The current approach 
16. When you perform an analysis, what steps do you go through? 
17. How much time is spent on analysing the data compared with its collection and 
report writing? 
18. What method(s) do you currently use to analyse accidents? 
19. What made you choose that specific method? 
20. What are the benefits of the method? 
21. What are the drawbacks of the method? 22. 
What other methods did you consider? 
23. Why is your current method better than the alternatives? 
24. When selecting a method what consideration do you give to: 
24.1 Validity and reliability? 
24.2 Usability? 
24.3 How it helps you generate recommendations? 
25. If I asked you to write a wish list of the features that your ideal analysis technique 
would possess, what would you write? 
Research–practice gap 
26. How do you keep up-to-date with new analysis theories and methods? 
27. What sort of input would you value from the researcher/practitioner community? 
28. What are the barriers which prevent the application of accident analysis research? 
29. How do you think those barriers could be removed? 
  
Appendix B  
Analysis 
tool 
I have 
never 
heard of 
it 
I have 
heard  of it 
but don’t I 
know how 
it works 
I understand 
how it works 
but I have 
never used 
it 
I have used 
it before but 
do not use it 
currently 
I 
currently 
use it 
STAMP      
FRAM      
Accimap      
Swiss 
Cheese 
     
MORT      
Fault 
Tree 
Analysis 
     
Domino 
model 
     
 
STAMP: Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
FRAM: Functional Resonance Accident Model 
MORT: Management Oversight and Risk Tree 
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